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The Catholic Church has steadfastly resisted efforts by labor relations
boards to protect the statutory rights of parochial school1 teachers who
have attempted to organize and bargain collectively.' Church leaders have
alleged that labor board jurisdiction violates the First Amendment religion
clauses by interfering with the educational mission of inculcating Catholic
faith and values. Courts have either accepted this argument and excepted
sectarian schools from labor relations acts4 or dismissed this claim and
permitted unrestricted regulationB These contradictory approaches illus-
trate the complexity of a constitutional question which has bedeviled labor
boards, judges, and scholars6 since 1973.
1. This Note will focus on Catholic ("parochial") schools for two reasons. First, they comprise the
majority o America's sectarian educational institutions. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
U.S. D-p'r OF EDUC., PRIVA-rx SCHOOLS BY LEVL AND AFIIAiTION 48 (1985) (Catholics operate
59% of church schools and educate 78% of students attending religious schools). See also OFFICIAL
CAtHOi.a: DIREI-ORY 1-2 app. (1984) (over 10,000 schools serve 3.65 million students and employ
127,300 lay teachers). Second, all the relevant caselaw concerns Catholic schools. See infra Section I.
This Note uses the term "Church" to signify the Catholic Church. The analysis developed herein
might apply to schools operated by other denominations; however, each religion's doctrines may raise
distinctive problems.
2. Both federal and state labor boards have regulated parochial schools. The National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982), establishes National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) jurisdiction over all employers affecting interstate commerce-including private schools. See
Windsor School, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 991 (1972). See also infra notes 9, 11, 12, & 18 (NLRB paro-
chial school cases). Board oversight of sectarian schools ended, however, with NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (construing NLRA as inapplicable to church schools to avoid
serious constitutional conflicts).
Because the NLRA does not cover parochial schools, states are not preempted from regulating this
area. See infra notes 35 & 50. For example, New York's Labor Relations Act was amended to in-
clude religious employers, and the state board's jurisdiction has been upheld against the clergy's
religion clause claims. See Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985).
Accordingly, this Note will develop guidelines for state labor boards. Nonetheless, the generic term
"labor boards" will be used, since the suggested approach would be equally applicable to the NLRB
if Congress amended the federal act to include religious schools.
3. See infra Section I.
4. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
5. See Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985).
6. Some commentators have argued that application of labor acts to parochial schools violates the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981)
(free exercise clause encompasses church's right to autonomy in managing its schools free from labor
board interference); Bastress, Government Regulation and the First Amendment Religion
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This Note argues that the governmental interest in extending statutory
guarantees to lay faculty" can be accommodated with the Church's free
exercise right to control religious aspects of Catholic education. Section I
discusses the conflicting judicial treatment of the First Amendment issues
raised by parochial school labor cases. Section II examines the religious
and historical context of Catholic lay teacher unionization. Incorporating
this factual background, Section III offers a constitutional re-analysis and
demonstrates that labor acts can be applied in a manner that preserves the
religious rights of Church employers. Labor boards must use their statu-
tory discretion8 to focus solely on secular matters-exercising power over
parochial schools that meet objective jurisdictional standards, enforcing the
duty to bargain over "bread and butter" employment terms only (e.g.,
salaries and benefits), and processing those unfair labor practice charges
that require no inquiry into religious doctrine. Courts must reject general
constitutional challenges to such modified enforcement of labor acts.
I. THE PAROCHIAL SCHOOL LABOR RELATIONS CASES
A. NLRB Assertion of Jurisdiction and the Initial Judicial Reaction
In the early 1970's, the NLRB began to exercise jurisdiction* whenever
a Catholic school's volume of interstate commerce met established mone-
tary criteria.10 However, the Board declined to handle "completely
Clauses-An Analysis of the NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools and Their Teachers, 17
DuQ. L. REv. 291 (1978) (Board jurisdiction offends religion clause values of individualism and
pluralism); Durso & Brice, NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago: Government Regulation Ver-
sus First Amendment Religious Freedoms, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 295 (1980) ("entanglement" doctrine
prohibits regulation of church schools); Pfeffer, Unionization of Parochial School Teachers, 24 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 273 (1980) (compulsory collective bargaining violates clergy's constitutional rights);
Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, the NLRA, and Parochial School Teachers, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 631 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Free Exercise] (free exercise bars NLRB interference).
For various defenses of labor board regulation, see, e.g., Kryvoruka, The Church, the State and the
National Labor Relations Act: Collective Bargaining in the Parochial Schools, 20 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 33 (1978) (government interest in enforcing NLRA outweighs any incidental religious infringe-
ments); Warner, NLRB Jurisdiction over Parochial Schools: Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB,
73 Nw. U.L. REv. 463 (1978) (Board regulation correct as policy and constitutional matter); Note,
The Religion Clauses and NLRB Jurisdiction over Parochial Schools, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 263
(1978) [hereinafter Note, Religion Clauses] (NLRB jurisdiction consistent with overall government
regulation of religious schools); Comment, Labor Relations in Parochial Schools: Should Lay Teach-
ers Be Denied Protection of the General Laws?, 17 SAN DtEGo L. REv. 1093 (1980) [hereinafter
Comment, Labor Relations] (parochial school teachers should not forfeit statutory labor rights).
7. Only lay teachers have unionized; "religious" faculty (nuns, brothers, and priests) maintain a
separate bargaining relationship with Catholic schools. See infra note 18.
8. While legislatures could enact special guidelines for labor board regulation of parochial schools,
in practice they prefer to establish general policies and procedures, authorizing boards to adapt these
standards to particular enterprises. For examples of NLRB discretion, see NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
164(c)(1) (1982) (decision to assert or decline jurisdiction); id. § 159(a)-(c) (designating appropriate
bargaining unit); id. § 158 (prosecuting unfair labor practice charges).
9. The Board first intervened in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 204 N.L.R.B. 159
(1973).
10. The NLRB intercedes only when a union files a representation petition on behalf of employ-
ees. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1982). The Board conducts a preliminary inquiry, analyzing the
employer's operation and determining whether its volume of interstate commerce meets minimum
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religious" schools such as seminaries and instead regulated only those "re-
ligiously associated."11 This standard engaged the NLRB in making con-
stitutionally problematic judgments about internal Church affairs."2 Nev-
ertheless, between 1973 and 1977 courts permitted Board jurisdiction. For
example, the Second Circuit assumed that such regulation was proper.13
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Grutka v. Barbour 4 lifted a lower court
order enjoining the NLRB from processing unfair labor practice charges
against the Diocese of Gary, Indiana, and ruled that the usual NLRA
review procedure adequately protected the Church's constitutional
rights. 5 While not necessarily endorsing the Board's actions, Grutka re-
jected the argument that NLRB oversight automatically breaches the First
Amendment."
Other judges displayed more sympathy to Church concerns. In Caul-
field v. Hirsch, a federal district court prohibited the Board from taking
jurisdiction over Philadelphia Catholic elementary schools.18 Repudiating
Grutka as "incorrectly decided," the Caulfield court reasoned that the
Church sought not mere judicial review of an administrative order, but
jurisdictional standards, which the Board has discretion to set. During the period when the NLRB
was asserting jurisdiction over parochial schools, the threshold was $1 million in revenues and
$50,000 in out-of-state purchases. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977).
11. See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 250 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976) (Board "doles] not
agree that the [Los Angeles Archdiocesan] schools are religious institutions intimately involved with
the Catholic Church").
13. Because the Church did not raise constitutional objections, the court never reached the religion
clause issues. See Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1977) (Brooklyn);
NLRB v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 535 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1976).
14. 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
15. Id. at 7-10. The NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982), requires exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. 549 F.2d at 7. The court rejected as premature the
Church's request for an injunction before any factual record had been developed. Id. at 8-9.
16. Id. at 8-10.
17. 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (E.D. Pa. 1977), discussed in Case Note, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 927.
18. The court declared an establishment clause "entanglement" violation because of the insepara-
bility of teacher employment conditions from the schools' religious mission. Id. at 3169-80. In Archdi-
ocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1181-82 (1977), the Board had determined that all lay
teachers in diocesan elementary schools constituted an appropriate bargaining unit. The Church then
sought an injunction, arguing that a multi-school unit destroyed the traditional autonomy of parish
priests in running elementary schools. 95 L.R.R.M. at 3165-66. See infra note 133 and accompany-
ing text.
The Caulfield court also accepted the Church's dubious contention that a lay faculty unit would
disrupt the "single undivided community of faith" composed of religious and lay teachers. 95
L.R.R.M. at 3176. But see Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 646-47 (Philadelphia Archdio-
cese had voluntarily negotiated with separate lay teacher union for nine years prior to Caulfield
without any discord). Bargaining with lay teachers should be no more detrimental to faculty unity
than the traditional Church practice of negotiating employment terms and conditions (e.g., stipend,
benefits, and housing) with agents from national religious orders that supply teachers. See J. GOLLIN,
WOR.DLY Gtx)trs 312-14 (1971). Moreover, lay-only bargaining units avoid the possibility of Board
interference in disputes between religious faculty and the Church. See Nazareth Regional High
School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming propriety of excluding religious
teachers).
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rather relief from the NLRB itself for exceeding its statutory and consti-
tutional authority.1"
B. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
The landmark case of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop'0 stemmed from the
refusal of the Chicago Archdiocese to recognize a Board-certified high
school lay teachers' union. The Seventh Circuit attacked the NLRB's
"completely religious/religiously associated" jurisdictional inquiry as an
abuse of discretion which imposed a government determination of a
school's spiritual nature on Church authorities." Rejecting the possibility
of accommodation, the court held that the Board had violated the religion
clauses by becoming "entangled" in religious affairs and by forcing the
Bishop to share with unions his canonical decision-making authority."
The Supreme Court affirmed on statutory grounds alone."3 Chief Jus-
tice Burger deemed First Amendment conflicts inescapable because
NLRB regulation would impair the Bishop's control over teachers, who
played a key role in the schools' religious mission.' 4 The Court assumed
that the Board would define "mandatory" subjects of collective bargaining
to encompass management issues such as curriculum, thus forcing the
Church to negotiate religious policy,' 5 and that NLRB investigators
would question the clergy's doctrinal judgments.' 6 The Chief Justice
avoided these potential constitutional problems by requiring "the affirma-
tive intention of Congress clearly expressed" to include church schools
19. Caulfield, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3167-68.
20. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). For discussion of Catholic Bishop, see Recent Cases, 84 Dicm. L. REv.
337 (1980); Case Note, 20 SArci'A CL.A L. Rrv. 259 (1980); Casenote, 11 Thx. TEc.H L. REv. 679
(1980); Note, 54 Tui.. L. RF~v. 786 (1980); Case Comment, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 173 (1980); Casenote,
24 WAYNE. L. RF;v. 1439 (1978).
21. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118-23 (7th Cir. 1977), af'd on other grounds,
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
22. Id. at 1124-31. Treating the religion clauses jointly under a "wall of separation" standard
instead of distinguishing them, the court incorrectly applied establishment cases dealing with parochial
school aid to the collective bargaining context, which raises free exercise issues. See 559 F.2d at 1113,
1118-19, 1124, 1129, 1131 (collapsing religion clauses); id. at 1119-24, 1130-31 (discussing
"parochaid" cases). The court's policy justification reflects such analytical confusion: "the Board is
cruelly whip-sawing schools by holding that institutions too religious to receive government assistance
are not religious enough to be excluded from its regulation." Id. at 1119. However, the establishment
clause bar against direct support to sectarian schools does not relieve church employers of the duty to
comply with government regulations. See infra note 104. Furthermore, the court ignored the fact that
religious schools receive certain forms of assistance. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
(permitting aid for books, testing, and remedial help).
23. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
24. Id. at 501-04.
25. Id. at 502-03. The Court mistakenly assumed that the public school model (all management
topics subject to negotiation) would be applied to church schools. See infra notes 80 and 85-89.
26. 440 U.S. at 502. Chief Justice Burger cited Board questioning of a Catholic school priest-
administrator about liturgies to illustrate such unconstitutional interference. Id. at 507-08 app.
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within the NLRA. 7 Finding no such purpose,28 the Court held the Act
inapplicable-a departure from its usual expansive interpretation.29
Justice Brennan led four dissenters in assailing the majority for "in-
venting" a canon of statutory construction to "amend" the NLRA,3 0 and
argued that the Act's text (extending to "all employers" except eight spec-
ified categories) and legislative history (Congress rejected an amendment
to exempt religious employers) revealed an intent to protect parochial
school teachers."' He also noted that an exception created solely for
church schools generated an establishment clause question.3 2
C. Catholic High School Association v. Culvert
Catholic Bishop invited further confusion at the state statutory level. In
Catholic High School Association v. Culvert,3 3 the Second Circuit ruled
that the New York State Labor Relations Board (SLRB) had properly
exercised jurisdiction over an Archdiocesan labor dispute" because the
State Labor Relations Act explicitly covered employees of religious and
educational organizations." Writing for the court, Judge Cardamone dis-
approved the Catholic Bishop dictum that labor board regulation causes
intractable constitutional problems.3 6 He dismissed the argument that
SLRB jurisdiction would compel the Church to bargain over management
topics implicating religious policy,37 noting that from 1969 to 1980 the
Archdiocese and the faculty union had confined negotiations to secular
employment terms.38 Furthermore, this case concerned the fir.t unfair la-
bor proceeding in fourteen years, 9 indicating a history of cooperation.
In light of these facts, the Second Circuit disposed of the Church's two
27. Id. at 500-01.
28. Id. at 504-07.
29. The traditional standard is that "Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest
jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause." NLRB v. Reliance
Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curiam).
30. 440 U.S. at 508-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
749-50 (1961) (interpretation must be "reasonable" and "fairly possible")).
31. 440 U.S. at 511-16.
32. Id. at 518 n.11. This issue is discussed infra notes 151-54.
33. 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985). This decision is criticized in Comment, The Constitutionality
of State Labor Relations Board Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools: Catholic High School Associa-
tion v. Culvert, 30 CATH. LAW. 162 (1986).
34. The union filed unfair labor practice charges against the Archdiocese of New York for sus-
pending 226 teachers who had protested the Church's attempt to change the substitution policy in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 753 F.2d at 1163-64.
35. 753 F.2d at 1163, 1171 (citing 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 890, at 2389 (amending State Labor
Relations Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1968))). The State Labor Board was not pre-
empted, because after Catholic Bishop the NLRB retained no jurisdiction over this employer. 753
F.2d at 1165 n.2.
36. Id. at 1163-69. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501-04 (1979) (foreseeing no
escape from serious constitutional difficulties).
37. 753 F.2d at 1167.
38. These limitations were reflected in collective bargaining agreement clauses entrusting all
religious functions to the Church. Id. at 1163.
39. Id. at 1165.
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religion clause defenses. The court first decided that the Board's
role-limited to ordering the diocese to bargain over secular subjects40 and
to processing unfair labor practice charges that required no investigation
of religious doctrine4-involved minimal supervision, not the "excessive
entanglement" necessary for an establishment clause violation. 42 The court
then held that the compelling state interest in enforcing labor laws justi-
fied any incidental burdens on the clergy's free exercise rights.'3
Judge Cardamone's focus on the factual history of parochial school la-
bor relations and his attempt to reconcile competing interests departed
from prior judicial approaches, which had accepted the Church's hypo-
thetical arguments and therefore rejected the feasibility of accommodation.
This Note adopts Catholic High School's general methodology and con-
clusions, but corrects two flaws in its First Amendment analysis. First, the
Second Circuit confused the central issue-free exercise "burden" on
Church autonomy in operating its schools-with establishment clause
"entanglement." ' 4 Reliance on the latter is misplaced because uniform ap-
plication of labor acts to all private schools does not "establish" (i.e., pub-
licly support) religion.' 5 Second, the court oversimplified the free exercise
problem by deeming the degree of infringement slight because compliance
with labor acts did not contravene Catholic doctrine, which champions
workers' rights.4'6 The Second Circuit thus failed to address fully the dis-
positive question of whether labor statutes interfered with the Catholic
educational mission-transmitting religious values.'7
D. Future Conflict and Probable Supreme Court Intervention
Catholic High School was not appealed to the Supreme Court, yet the
decision foreshadows conflict. Eighteen states-including many with a
40. Id. at 1167. Also, the Board cannot compel agreement over specific contract terms. Id.
41. Id. at 1168-69. For example, in an illegal discharge claim, the Board could proceed only
where a teacher would not have been fired "but for" anti-union animus. Id. (citing NLRB v. Trans-
portation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (discussed infra text accompanying note 144)).
42. 753 F.2d at 1166-69.
43. Reasoning that the SLRB did not infringe the Church's absolute freedom to hold religious
beliefs but rather regulated conduct, the court compared labor laws to other constitutionally permissi-
ble exercises of the police power (e.g., state testing of teachers). Id. at 1169-71.
44. See id. at 1166-69.
45. This Note adopts Laycock's argument that an establishment violation must involve state assis-
tance to religion, and that the establishment clause therefore does not apply to parochial school labor
relations. For further explanation, see infra note 104.
46. 753 F.2d at 1170, citing Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 52 n.74 (noting Church's historically
staunch support of unions). This analysis ignores the Bishops' free exercise right to pursue Catholic
labor goals (e.g., justice for workers) independent of state-dictated methods, even though government
labor laws and Catholic ideology may share certain aims. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1399. Catho-
lic High School invoked Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883, 886-89 (D.C. Cir. 1970), for
the proposition that the NLRA does not compel "belief' in collective bargaining. 753 F.2d at 1170.
The question, however, is not whether a law demands belief, but whether a neutral statute as applied
infringes free exercise rights.
47. Also, while commending the SLRB's restraint, the court did not place explicit limits on Board
power in order to ensure future non-interference.
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large number of parochial schools-have labor acts;4" all but one have
been construed to encompass every employer not specifically exempted."
The state statutes that cover nonprofit or religious organizations are not
subject to the preemption doctrine, which applies only to provisions identi-
cal to those in federal acts.50 Currently, only New York and Hawaii labor
boards regulate Catholic schools, 51 but other states seem likely to follow. 2
Churches will continue to raise First Amendment defenses, with inconsis-
tent results. Circuit court conflict'" will eventually require the Supreme
Court to resolve the constitutional question left open in Catholic Bishop."
48. Labor relations acts in states with many Catholic schools include: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-
101 to -l1lb (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, §§ 1-12 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.1-.30 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-1 to -14
(West Supp. 1987); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 700-717 (McKinney 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§
211.1-.13 (Purdon 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-7-1 to -7-47 (1986); and Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
111.01-.19 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986).
For other state labor acts, see Coi.o. R.v. STAT. §§ 8-3-101 to -123 (1986); HAW. REv. STAT. §§
377-1 to -18 (1976 & Supp. 1980); KAN. STATr. ANN. §§ 44-801 to -817 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 179.01-.17 (West 1966 & Supp. 1987); N.D. CENiT. CODE §§ 34-12-01 to -12-14 (1980 & Supp.
1985); OR. Rpm. STr. §§ 663.005-.295 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-9A-1 to -15
(Michie 1978 & Supp. 1987); UrAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-20-1 to -13 (1974 & Supp. 1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1501-1623 (1978); W. VA. CODE §§ 21-IA-1 to -8 (Michie 1985).
49. For the lone exception, see In Re Salvation Army, 349 Pa. 105, 36 A.2d 479 (1944) (constru-
ing Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act as not extending to nonindustrial, nonprofit employers). Other
statutes have been interpreted to include nonprofit institutions. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Wal-
lace Village for Children, 165 Colo. 10, 437 P.2d 62 (1968); Success Village Apts., Inc. v. Local 376,
UAW, 175 Conn. 165, 397 A.2d 85 (1978); Kelley v. Day Care Center, 141 Vt. 608, 451 A.2d 1106
(1982); Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc'y, 242 Wis. 78, 7 N.W.2d
590 (1943). See also In re Our Lady Queen of Angels Church, M.L.M.B. Case No. R66 C-156
(1966) (construing Michigan Labor Mediation Act as covering certain church employees).
50. See supra notes 2 & 35. See also Christ the King Regional High School v. Culvert, 815 F.2d
219, 222 (2d Cir. 1987) (since NLRB retains no jurisdiction over Catholic school employer, state
labor board remains free to regulate).
51. For discussion of New York's regulation, see supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. See
also Roman Catholic Church, Case No. 37-RC-2081, NLRB Region 537, Honolulu, Hawaii (filed
July 18, 1975). When the NLRB withdrew, the Hawaii state board filled the vacuum. Pfeffer, supra
note 6, at 284.
52. See supra note 49.
53. Indeed, intra-circuit conflict has appeared on these issues. In Universidad Central de
Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383 (Ist Cir. 1986) (en banc), the court deadlocked 3-3 over extending
Catholic Bishop to universities; as a result, the Board's request for enforcement of a collective bargain-
ing order was denied. Three judges argued that Catholic Bishop's reasoning was inapplicable because
college professors inculcate religious values to a much lesser degree than do Catholic elementary and
secondary school teachers. Id. at 383-91, 403-06. They cited Catholic High School for the proposition
that labor boards play a limited role requiring no intrusion into religion. Id. at 388, 406. For further
discussion, see Case Comment, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 255 (1987).
54. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 504, 507 (1979). In resolving this issue, the Court
should follow established principles of federalism by deferring to a state labor board, unless the
Church provides concrete evidence of a free exercise injury. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986) (reversing federal court injunction of state commis-
sion's investigation of sex discrimination claim filed by discharged sectarian school teacher, provided
that church had opportunity to litigate First Amendment claims during and after proceedings).
Decisions affecting Catholic schools also have important practical ramifications, since the Church
runs America's largest private educational system, as described supra note 1. See, e.g., Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773, 795 (1973) (denying state aid might exacerbate financial
plight of parochial schools, thereby causing crisis in public education).
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II. THE RELIGIOUS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PAROCHIAL
SCHOOL LABOR RELATIONS
The judicial rift begun by Catholic High School underscores the need
for a fresh approach which nonetheless comports with the Supreme
Court's free exercise jurisprudence. When individuals or institutions de-
mand exemption from regulation on religious grounds, the Court's thresh-
old task is to determine whether their allegations have a realistic founda-
tion in a church's doctrine and customs5 5-an inquiry designed to detect
feigned" or speculative claims.57 Where a petitioner establishes that ap-
plication of a law "burdens" a sincere" belief vital to his religion, the
state must prove that the regulation serves a "compelling" interest." For
example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,60 the Court examined the theology and
history of the Amish Church, concluding that enforcement of a compul-
sory school attendance statute would violate the "central," "fundamental"
Amish belief that secular education past eighth grade contaminates chil-
dren6 l and would threaten the intensely religious, agrarian Amish life-
style.6 2 Yoder remains the only case where the Court has found free exer-
cise hardship to be so extreme as to compel invalidation of a general
55. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-19 (1972), discussed infra notes 60-62 and ac-
companying text. Cf. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (examining
Church's diocesan structure, law, and history to conclude that secular courts cannot review decisions
of highest ecclesiastical tribunal).
56. The free exercise clause mandates judicial -deference to religion. See, e.g., United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (tribunals "forbidden" from analyzing "truth" of individual religious
beliefs); Serbian Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713 (yielding to institutional authorities' interpretation of doc-
trine). Because claimants could exploit such deferefice, however, courts inevitably must ascertain
whether a belief or practice is "religious." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1981).
57. See, e.g., Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("there must in fact be an identifiable burden on the exercise of religion"); Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985) (claimant must show government program
"actually burdens" religious beliefs). Cf. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 131-32 (1937)
(applying NLRA despite employer's First Amendment free press objections, because alleged injury
"mere conjecture").
58. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965) (draft board may question sincerity
of religious claim for military exemption).
59. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-07 (1963) (formulating strict scrutiny test).
60. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
61. Id. at 210-19.
62. An exemption was granted only because the claimant "convincingly demonstrated," by refer-
ence to "a history of three centuries," the sincerity of his religious belief and the hazards of state
enforcement to the survival of the Amish faith; the Court emphasized that "few other religious
groups" could make such a showing. Id. at 234-36.
Unlike religions that stress worldly detachment, Catholicism links spiritual ideals to the secular
community. See Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, in THE DOCUMEN-r OF
VAriCAN 11 199 (W. Abbott ed. 1966) [hereinafter DocuMENtS]. The Church's labor advocacy and
philosophy of integrated (temporal-religious) education illustrate this approach. See infra notes 66-74
and accompanying text. This commitment to societal involvement suggests that compliance with labor
laws will affect Catholic enterprises less seriously than other religious employers-especially those
who believe that unionism is evil per se. See Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (enforcing Act against Seventh Day Adventist employer whose religion condemns unions).
Compulsory board jurisdiction will, however, infringe Church freedom to pursue a labor policy ac-
cording to its interpretation of Catholic labor doctrine. See supra note 46.
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regulatory law; three other claimants have prevailed in the specific context
of unemployment compensation statutes applied to deny them benefits be-
cause they followed their beliefs." Using a modified Yoder methodology,"
this Note analyzes relevant Catholic doctrine and the history of lay teach-
ers' unions to evaluate the allegations of some Church leaders that labor
board jurisdiction will undermine ecclesiastical authority over education."5
While perhaps sincerely advanced, such claims are unsupported by empir-
ical data. Indeed, the existing pattern in many dioceses-combining collec-
tive bargaining over compensation with Church autonomy over religious
issues-should continue as long as labor boards confine their inquiry to
secular matters.
A. Catholic Labor and Education Doctrines and the Development of
Parochial School Teachers' Unions
Historically, the Catholic Church in the United States adapted the Vat-
ican's pro-labor ideology 6 to achieve practical ends, helping Catholic im-
migrants find protection in labor organizations." In the twentieth century,
social changes wrought by world wars and depression brought redoubled
Catholic efforts to ameliorate the plight of workers." American Catholics
also continued the Church's traditional educational mission."' An inde-
pendent school system flourished, serving the large immigrant community
at low cost.70 Schools were staffed by nuns and priests vowed to poverty
and obedience-ensuring an inexpensive and compliant labor supply.7 1
The Second Vatican Council (1962-65)-reaffirming the importance of
63. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on
Sabbath); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987) (same); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jehovah's Witness fired for rejecting transfer to plant's munitions
department).
64. A strict Yoder approach-investigating church doctrine and history to distinguish core from
peripheral religious values-presents a grave danger: substituting judicial determination of the "cen-
trality" of a belief for the judgment of church authorities. This Note suggests that courts conduct a
doctrinal/historical inquiry only to provide a background against which to evaluate Church claims on
a case-by-case basis. In the parochial school context, judges must focus not on determining the central-
ity of religious education to Catholicism, but rather on evaluating evidence concerning the effect of
labor laws on the educational mission.
65. See, e.g., Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Board will force
bargaining over religious curriculum and moral/spiritual conduct expected of teachers).
66. See POPE LEo XII, RERUM NOVARUM (1893) (encyclical urging humane treatment of labor-
ers and encouraging formation of unions).
67. See J. Et.~is, D(X:UME.NTS OF AMERICAN CA'HOIsc HISTORY 611-29 (1956) (describing.
Church service to immigrants and historical solidarity with unions).
68. See, e.g., POPE Ptus X, QUADREGESIMO ANNO (1931) (encyclical expressing special concern
for workers); M. PIEt., BREAKIN(; BREAD 118-33 (1982) (discussing Depression-era picketing, boy-
cotts, and strikes by radical Catholic Worker Movement).
69. See 1983 CODE c.796-806 (canon law mandates religious education).
70. See Trabold, Educating the Immigrants: A Challenging Catholic Experiment, 13 MIGRA-
TION TODAY 43 (1985).
71. NATrIONAl. CONF. OF CxmoItC BISHOPS, FCONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: A PASTORAL LET-
TER ON CATrI-HG: SOcIAL TEACHIN; AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 174-75 (1986) [hereinafter Eco-
NOMIC JUs'I(:I (acknowledging religious teachers' sacrifices).
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religious education, 2 stressing social justice, 3 and encouraging popular
participation 74-and the subsequent dramatic decrease in religious voca-
tions7" transformed American Catholic education. As lay people replaced
nuns as the principal source of teachers, 6 questions arose concerning the
Church's commitment to applying its labor doctrine to its own workers.
Simultaneously, rising public school teacher militancy restructured secular
education." Labor acts were applied to teachers, 8 who gained an unprec-
edented share of participation in management decisions."9
The combination of burgeoning Catholic school lay faculties and suc-
cessful public educational unions catalyzed formation of parochial school
teacher associations.8" The Catholic hierarchy's reaction to unionization
ranged from encouragement to grudging acceptance to rejection." Some
Church leaders justified disregarding Catholic pro-labor doctrine as neces-
sary to preserve both episcopal authority and the financial health of Cath-
72. Declaration on Christian Education, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 637-51. See also
NATIONAL CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHops, To TEACH As JFsus DID (1972) (religious faith informs
all learning).
73. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 62,
at 199-308 (focusing on duty to help exploited social groups, including workers).
74. Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 489-521.
75. See Kerkhofs, Vatican l-Twenty Years On, 102 PRO MUNDI VrrA 1, 23-32 (1985) (be-
tween 1964-1983, about 45,000 left priesthood, and seminary enrollment shrank; number of sisters
has also "fallen sharply").
76. See NAIONAI. CATHoI.IC EDuC. ASS'N, UNITED STATES CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
AND THEIR FINANCES 1-2 (1986) [hereinafter ELEMENTARY SCHOOLs] (current 80:20 ratio of lay to
religious faculty reverses pre-Vatican II percentages).
77. S. Co.:, THE UNIONIZATION OF TEAcEnis 3-10 (1969) (describing American Federation of
Teachers' militant tactics in early 1960's); M. MosKow, TEACHERS AND UNIONS 2-5 (1966) (same).
78. Many states have separate labor acts for teachers. See, e.g., Teacher Negotiation Act of 1965,
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-153a-n (1985).
79. C. PERRY & W. WILDMAN, THE IMPAC:r OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC. EDUCATION 139-89
(1970) (teachers' unions negotiate many policy matters, including curriculum, grading, extracurricular
activities, and class size). In contrast, employee participation in industrial management is rare. See
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (construing NLRA § 8(d) as
requiring "good faith bargaining" over "mandatory" subjects such as salaries, benefits, and working
conditions, but not over "permissive" management issues).
80. However, lay teachers adopted a unique bargaining model that reflected the separate evolu-
tion of Catholic education. Unions limited negotiations to "bread and butter" issues and deferred to
exclusive clerical control over all decisions implicating religious policy. See Kryvoruka, supra note 6,
at 71-74 (management topics linked to religion are outside scope of "mandatory" bargaining).
81. For example, the Philadelphia Archdiocese has bargained voluntarily with a lay teachers'
union since 1969. See Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 646-47; Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at
34 n.9. Similarly, Hartford has negotiated eight bargaining agreements with a teachers' association
since 1965. Interview with Fr. James Fanelli, Superintendent of Hartford Archdiocesan High Schools
(Apr. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Fanelli Interview]. In contrast, the Chicago Archdiocese immediately
opposed teachers' unions. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). A hostile relationship
also developed in Brooklyn. See cases listed supra note 13 for details of disputes.
Officially, Church leaders adopted a compromise position: they recognized the right of teachers to
form unions and bargain collectively, but demanded respect for the "special character" of Catholic
schools as faith communities devoted to religious and moral values. U.S. Catholic Conf. Subcomm. on
Teacher Organizations, Teachers Unions In Catholic Schools, 7 ORIGINS 225, 227-29 (1977). The
Church stated that "the role of the government in monitoring the civil aspects [of labor relations]...
is capable ultimately of a solution which will be satisfactory to all concerned parties." Id. at 229.
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olic education,8" creating the impression that compliance with labor acts
would have disastrous consequences.
B. The Results of Parochial School Unionization
The actual process and impact of collective bargaining in parochial
schools indicate the possibility of coexistence. Since the mid-1960's,
twenty-seven dioceses have negotiated with teachers' associations.83 Catho-
lic schools in New York and Hawaii" have experienced compulsory labor
board regulation. The results of unionization refute the myths that bar-
gaining inevitably causes spiritual and economic chaos and that enforce-
ment of labor acts entails insoluble constitutional difficulties.
Diocesan collective bargaining illustrates the feasibility of separating
"mandatory" secular topics (e.g., salaries and benefits) from "permissive"
religious issues.88 In fact, the National Association of Catholic School
Teachers, which represents many unions, insists on inclusion in bargain-
ing agreements of broad "management rights" clauses guaranteeing the
hierarchy's freedom to operate schools according to Catholic principles
and removing all matters of faith from arbitration and the unfair labor
practice process.86 Such respect for ecclesiastical prerogatives was dis-
played by the NLRB during the mid-1970's87 and has been maintained
by state labor boards. 8 This crucial insight has escaped the notice of
many judges, who have assumed that the public school model of negotiat-
ing policy matters would be applied to church-operated schools.
8 9
82. See, e.g., Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1977) (collective
bargaining erodes Bishop's authority and threatens economic stability of Catholic schools), affd, 440
U.S. 490 (1979).
83. Interview with John Reilly, President of the National Association of Catholic School Teachers
(Feb. 5, 1987) [hereinafter Reilly Interview]. Most of these dioceses bargain voluntarily, perhaps
suggesting that Catholic leaders object not to unions per se, but rather to labor board oversight with
"attendant costs in money, effort, and policy sacrifices." Bastress, supra note 6, at 338-39. However,
this argument has two defects. First, it fails to explain why most dioceses have discouraged any teach-
ers' organizations. See NA'i. CATHOImC EDuc. Ass'N, CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS AND THEIR Fi-
NANCtFS 8 (1986) (hereinafter HIGH SCHOOLs] and S.F. Examiner, Nov. 20, 1986, at A3, col. I
(NCEA estimates that although 23% of teachers are represented by some group, only 2% belong to
true unions). Second, it exaggerates the negative impact of regulation by assuming that boards force
negotiations over religious policy and implies that any law causing the Church economic loss or incon-
venience is invalid. See infra notes 85-90.
84. See supra note 51.
85. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Archdiocese of Hartford and the Hartford Catholic Educa-
tion Association, July 1, 1983-June 30, 1986, at 5-6 (hereinafter Agreement] (diocese retains "exclu-
sive right" to manage Catholic schools in all aspects-including curriculum, budget, personnel, and
enrollment). See also diocesan collective bargaining agreements on file at the National Association of
Catholic School Teachers Office in Philadelphia.
86. Reilly Interview, supra note 83. See Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 82-83 (NLRB must recog-
nize "managemental prerogative" in which employer's religious interests are protected absolutely).
87. Examination of NLRB and federal cases reveals no Board attempts to force negotiations over
management issues enmeshed with religion. See supra Section I.
88. See, e.g., Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1163 n.1 (1985) (Archdioce-
san agreement limited to secular issues, reserving religious functions to Church control).
89. Lacking any record evidence to support the conclusion that labor boards interfere with
religious policy in elementary and secondary church schools, courts have incorporated irrelevant stud-
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Parochial school labor relations have been generally peaceful. Indeed,
in some dioceses unionization has helped to reduce tension by clarifying
the respective roles of priests and teachers and by identifying the goals of
Catholic education.9" Unfair labor practices are uncommon. For example,
Catholic High School represented the first litigation arising out of a bar-
gaining relationship that had begun in 1969;91 in Philadelphia, ten years
elapsed between the advent of unionism and the first arbitration.' 2 Simi-
larly, unions have rarely used pressure tactics: only a handful of strikes
have occurred, and all were quickly settled. 3 Where low salaries and poor
working conditions have caused lay faculty unrest, denying labor board
jurisdiction will exacerbate, not eliminate, dissatisfaction.
Finally, the Church has never established a correlation between lay
teacher collective bargaining and Catholic school fiscal instability.' 4 Mul-
tiple factors unrelated to unionization (particularly demographic changes)
explain the financial problems that plague parochial schools.95 Further-
ies detailing the transmutation of management issues (e.g., academic standards) into mandatory bar-
gaining topics in public colleges-most frequently Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Educa-
tion, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1067, 1075 (1969). See, e.g., Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164,
3176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (certified union will expand bargaining subjects to include religious issues);
Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1124 (7th Cir. 1977), affd, 440 U.S. 490, 502-03 (1979).
See also Bastress, supra note 6, at 324-30; Durso & Brice, supra note 6, at 307-09; Laycock, supra
note 6, at 1399; Comment, supra note 33, at 174-75; Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at
658-60. Such assumptions ignore the distinctive bargaining history between Catholic schools and
teachers' unions, who have always treated management issues regarding religion as non-negotiable.
See supra note 80. See also Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1167-68 (rejecting applicability of
public school studies). See generally Note, Religioi Clauses, supra note 6, at 279-80 (criticizing
judicial use of extrinsic literature to avoid case facts).
90. For example, Hartford's contract contains a preface outlining the mission of Catholic schools,
and states that teachers "are expected to conduct themselves . . . in a manner consistent with the
academic, social, moral and religious teachings of the Catholic Church." Agreement, supra note 85, at
1-4 (preface); id. at 7 (quote).
91. 753 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1985).
92. Reilly Interview, supra note 83. Many grievances are referred to arbitration-private dispute
resolution which involves no government interference. Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 66-71.
93. For example, Hartford has never experienced a strike. Fanelli Interview, supra note 81. In
1971, teachers in San Francisco and New York walked out. See Boles, Persistent Problems of Church,
State, and Education, 1 J.L. & EnuC. 601, 605 (1972). The only other dioceses where strikes have
occurred are Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. See Pittsburgh Press, Sept. 11, 1985, at A12, col. 1; Phila-
delphia Inquirer, May 5, 1985.
94. Indeed, official Catholic school financial statistics reflect imprecise estimates. See ELEMEN-
TARY SCHOOLS, supra note 76, at 3-5; HIGH SCHOOLS, supra note 83, at 2. Although these figures
reveal budget difficulties nationwide, dioceses that bargain collectively have no greater problems than
dioceses that unilaterally impose contract terms. Id. See also Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 57 n.100
("parochial schools that have complied with orders to bargain have experienced . . . no economic
collapse"). The absence of any connection between unionization and fiscal soundness does not reflect
the greater willingness of financially healthy dioceses to accept labor organizations. On the contrary,
wealthy dioceses (e.g., Chicago) led the anti-union fight. See J. GOLLIN, supra note 18, at 280 (Chi-
cago is America's richest diocese, with assets of $610 million).
95. See generally A. GREEI.EY, W. MCCREADY & K. MCCOURT, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN A
DECLINING CURCH 7-11 (1976) (discussing reduced family size among Catholics and corresponding
decline in school enrollment); id. at 40-75 (movement of Catholics from ethnic city neighborhoods to
suburbs lacking parochial schools); id. at 230-62 (decreased collections). See also J. GOLLIN, supra
note 18, at 390-92 (attributing financial problems partly to mismanagement); A. GREELEY, THE
AMERICAN CAT-oLIC 169-71 (1977) (same).
Admittedly, the shift to lay faculty has contributed to budget problems. See HIGH SCHOOLS, supra
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more, common sense dictates that teachers understand the economic situa-
tion"' and wish to preserve Catholic schools-and their jobs.'7
Responding to post-Vatican II realities, American bishops in 1986 en-
dorsed a cooperative, financially responsible approach to negotiations."
The hierarchy acknowledged past failures in applying Catholic labor
teachings to Church institutions9' and pledged to "fully recognize the
rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively." 100 Although not
legally binding, this moral commitment may signal a new era in parochial
school employment relations and foreclose challenges to labor laws.' 1
In short, compliance with labor relations acts may require some adjust-
ments, but need not sacrifice the clergy's First Amendment right to control
all religious matters in parochial schools. 10 2
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RE-ANALYSIS
These overlooked doctrinal and historical factors necessitate a constitu-
tional reevaluation of prior decisions. Courts have weakened their First
Amendment analyses by applying establishment clause rules prohibiting
"entanglement"' 03
-relevant when state agencies implement statutes
designed to aid religion-to parochial school labor relations cases, which
more properly turn on the free exercise issue of government "burdens" on
religion resulting from enforcement of impartial regulatory laws104
note 83, at 5-6 (lay teachers average $7000 more in annual compensation than their religious counter-
parts). Nevertheless, these costs have arisen independent of union influence. See supra note 83 (98%
of Catholic teachers not unionized). Moreover, represented high school faculty earn S21,164 in salary
and benefits-only 10% more than non-organized teachers. See HIGH SCHOOLS, supra note 83, at 8.
Finally, even if labor board jurisdiction were to cause increases in remuneration, such economic fac-
tors would not affect analysis of the constitutionality of labor relations acts. See infra note 140.
96. Indeed, the Philadelphia lay teachers' union in 1982 helped form "Business Leadership Or-
ganized for Catholic Schools," which has raised $30 million. Reilly Interview, supra note 83. See
Gary, Business Joins Education in Support of Catholic Schools, 16 MOMENTUM 41 (1985).
97. Faith inspires many teachers to serve the Church. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19
(1971). Others work in parochial schools because of the tight public school job market. See Comment,
Labor Relations, supra note 6, at 1112; Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1130 (7th Cir.
1977) (many teachers "[noti altogether motivated in seeking employment by the love of the institu-
tion"), affd, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Neither faculty group is likely to wish to destroy parochial schools.
98. See EONOMIC JusTrC:E, supra note 71, at 174-76.
99. Id. at 174-75.
100. Id. at 176.
101. See id. at 54 (advocating vigorous enforcement of labor laws). The Church cannot justify
excluding itself from labor acts, unless an exemption is necessary to protect Catholic education.
102. See Note, Religion Clauses, supra note 6, at 283 (continued operation of Catholic schools
with organized faculties indicates that unions do not destroy schools' religious purposes); Kryvoruka,
supra note 6, at 50 n.68 (same).
103. To survive establishment clause scrutiny, a law must have a secular purpose, must not have
the "primary effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion, and must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
104. Where free exercise rights are at stake, the Court shows less concern for establishment
problems than in cases involving state aid to religion. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (granting exception where religious beliefs conflict with regulation) with Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (invalidating state salary supplements to church school teachers). Nonetheless, expan-
sion of the establishment clause to include action that "inhibits" religion has created confusion. See
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Furthermore, in evaluating free exercise claims, judges have mechani-
cally applied the Sherbert v. Verner'0 5 paradigm (i.e., an individual de-
nied statutory benefits for obeying her religious convictions) without ques-
tioning its relevance to Catholic school labor disputes,"0 6 which involve
different parties and issues. First, an institutional rather than individual
claim is asserted: the Church's right to operate schools free from state
interference.1 0 7 Second, unlike the unemployment compensation scheme
voided in Sherbert, labor relations acts do not withhold government lar-
gesse from Catholic employers for adhering to their beliefs.108 On the con-
trary, the Church is requesting the special benefit of exemption from neu-
tral labor laws; in analogous situations, the Court has refused to grant
such privileges.10' Moreover, Sherbert's three part test-considering
whether claims are religious or secular, whether state action "burdens"
free exercise, and whether the government has a sufficiently "compelling
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. Since a government inhibition is also an infringement of free exercise, courts
have mistakenly invoked the establishment clause to examine free exercise issues. See generally Lay-
cock, supra note 6, at 1378-85. To illustrate, judges have applied establishment cases involving state
support of Catholic schools to parochial school labor disputes. See, e.g., Catholic Bishop v. NLRB,
559 F.2d 1112, 1131 (7th Cir. 1977), affid, 440 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1979) (collapsing, discussion of
"entanglement" with analysis of free exercise "burdens" caused by enforcement of NLRA); Caulfield
v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3178-79 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same); Catholic High School Ass'n v. Cul-
vert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1166-69 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). Commentators have continued this misguided
"entanglement" analysis. See Durso & Brice, supra note 6; Bastress, supra note 6, at 315-37; Note,
Religion Clauses, supra note 6, at 269-72, 281-85;. Pfeffer, supra note 6, at 289-90.
The "entanglement" in the "parochaid" cases involved ongoing government surveillance of teachers
to ensure state funds were not being used for sectarian purposes. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975). Such intrusive monitoring is a far cry from the minimal interference caused
by labor board jurisdiction. See Warner, supra note 6, at 478-91; Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 46-47,
61-62. Moreover, statutes granting money to church schools are distinguishable from purely regula-
tory laws, even though statutory "neutrality" remains an elusive concept. See, e.g., Lemon at 613 (in
subsidizing parochial schools, legislature pursued secular aim of enhancing quality of education).
105. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. See, e.g., Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1124; Caulfield, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3178; Catholic High
School, 753 F.2d at 1169-71.
107. This institutional "right to autonomy" recognizes that individuals usually exercise religion
through churches, which deserve constitutional protection in defining and developing religious beliefs
and practices. See Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2871 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citing Laycock, supra note 6, at 1389).
108. See supra note 63 (cases striking down unemployment compensation statutes). Sherbert rec-
ognized that a statute imposing an "indirect" financial burden, forcing one to forego religious prac-
tices (e.g., Sabbath observance) to obtain benefits, offends free exercise as much as a law that directly
compels or prohibits religious conduct. 374 U.S. at 403-04. Sherbert does not imply, however, that
any regulation which increases a church's costs is an unconstitutional "indirect burden." See infra
notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
109. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting Amish religious objector's request
for exemption from paying social security taxes); id. at 261-64 (Stevens, J., concurring) (while state
must show compelling interest to justify "unequal treatment" of religious observers, burden of proof
shifts to claimant who demands exemption from neutral, generally-applicable law). See also Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding IRS denial of tax-exempt status to
religious college which sought exception from antidiscrimination laws on ground that their religion
mandated certain forms of racial discrimination).
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interest" 11 -has been inconsistently applied, reflecting the Court's desire
to weigh more heavily legislative concerns.""'
Balancing the Church's wish to prevent labor board intrusion against
the state's interest in protecting employees' rights, this Note uses a flexible
free exercise analysis which devises limiting principles that tailor board
jurisdiction to accommodate First Amendment concerns,,"
A. Regulation of Parochial Schools and Their Teachers: The Church's
General Claims
The Church's argument that religious affiliation relieves a school em-
ployer of the duty to obey labor acts equates any government contact with
unconstitutional interference and ignores already-pervasive regulation. 1"
Except for wholly spiritual practices like worship, freedom to act in exer-
cise of beliefs is not absolute.' 14 Important but not purely religious areas
like education may be regulated in their secular aspects. 1 5 For example,
under its police power, the government enforces fire, building, and zoning
ordinances.1 16 Pursuant to educational codes, states accredit and inspect
all schools, certify teachers, and implement attendance, calendar, and cur-
riculum requirements' 17-thereby imposing government educational pref-
erences on church schools and directly influencing the process of transmit-
110. 374 U.S. at 403-07.
111. For example, the state interest in uniform administration of the social security system over-
rode an Amish farmer's Yoder-like claim of free exercise interference. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). See
also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (government interest in maintaining armed forces
overcomes free exercise claim of conscientious objector); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(military's need for uniformity sufficient reason to uphold regulation against indoor headgear over
free exercise claim of Jew wearing yarmulke). Compare Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2153-58
(1986) (plurality opinion) (statute requiring provision of social security number to receive welfare
benefits upheld as serving "legitimate public interest" even though it "indirectly and incidentally"
forced choice between adhering to beliefs or obtaining benefits) with Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1048-50 (1987) (criticizing Roy and reaffirming "compelling state
interest" scrutiny).
112. Cf Comment, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 662 (rejecting "tailoring" as too costly).
113. Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 48 n.58 (parochial schools subject to significant degree of state
regulation which presupposes severance of religious from secular conduct). Such comprehensive super-
vision vitiates Laycock's argument that clergy might oppose labor board jurisdiction to avoid a prece-
dent which could be used to justify regulation in other areas. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1398-99.
114. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
115. See Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimina-
tion by Religious Organizations, 79 COi.UM. L. REv. 1514, 1539-49 (1979) (placing church schools
midway between core spiritual practices (e.g., worship) which are immune from government regula-
tion and purely secular enterprises (e.g., businesses) where regulation is acceptable).
Especially where the Church supplants a state institution, the government may implement uniform
standards. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-48 (1968) (schools used to fulfill
compulsory education laws may be required to meet state-imposed instructional criteria). Full-time
church schools must be distinguished from supplementary religious programs offered for children who
attend public schools. See Board of Jewish Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974) (declining jurisdiction
over such operations).
116. See Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1169-70 (2d Cir. 1985).
117. See supra note 115. See also Note, Religion Clauses, supra note 6, at 281-83 (detailing
Catholic school compliance with Illinois scholastic regulations).
19871
The Yale Law Journal
ting religious faith."' In the area of employment, administrative agencies
ensure compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act,"19 Title VII,120
and payroll tax and deduction laws""-thus increasing operating costs.
Since the Catholic Church accepts this comprehensive regulation, labor
board jurisdiction should be similarly unobjectionable.12
The foregoing analysis reveals the myopia of Catholic Bishop's exclu-
sive focus on a teacher's "unique role . . . in fulfilling the mission of a
church-operated school. 123 Existing government regulation implicitly ac-
knowledges two other roles: as a substitute for a public school instructor
and as an employee, a parochial school teacher is subject to ordinary edu-
cational and employment laws. Therefore, unless labor relations acts are
peculiarly burdensome, they likewise should be enforced.
B. Labor Relations Acts and Free Exercise Interference
Labor acts, which expressly limit labor board jurisdiction and remedial
power, 24 seem less intrusive than other regulations imposed on schools.
Boards intervene only at the request of employees who decide to exercise
their right to organize and bargain collectively. 2 5 Moreover, labor laws
preserve managerial control over personnel and policy matters and pro-
hibit only anti-union activities." 6 Nevertheless, the potential for free exer-
cise interference arises in applying particular statutory provi-
sions-problems best foreclosed by restricting labor board discretion.
118. For a radical proposal, see Developments in the Law-Religion and the State. Government
Regulation of Religious Organizations, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1740, 1757-58, 1777-78 (1987) (Church
right to autonomy outweighs state interest in uniform educational standards, justifying exemption of
parochial school curriculum, teachers, and operations from regulation).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). See Marshall v. Pacific Union Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists,
No. CV-75-3032-R (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1977) (FLSA applicable to Seventh Day Adventist schools).
120. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982). See EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477, 486-89 (5th Cir. 1980) (application of Title VII's provisions proscribing
racial and sexual discrimination to lay teachers at Baptist college did not interfere with school's reli-
gious mission), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981). But c. Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S.Ct. 2862
(1987) (upholding constitutionality of Title VII exemption of church organizations from prohibition
against religious discrimination in employment).
121. In general, tax laws are uniformly applied. See supra note 109 (discussing United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)). But see St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451
U.S. 772 (1981) (exempting certain church schools from unemployment compensation taxes).
122. Courts have rejected attempts by Church employers to resist NLRB jurisdiction in every
enterprise except parochial schools. See, e.g., Denver Post of the Nat'l Socty of Volunteers of Am. v.
NLRB, 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1984) (Board may regulate religious organization that maintains
chapels); Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982) (allowing
NLRB jurisdiction over nursing home).
123. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
124. Both the NLRA and state labor acts contain detailed provisions outlining the process by
which labor boards exercise jurisdiction. See supra note 10. Indeed, boards lack the power to enforce
their own orders. See, e.g., NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(d), § 160(e)-(g) (1982). Thus, if a labor board
ever exceeded its bounds in issuing an order, a Catholic employer could refuse to comply and could
raise religion clause defenses if the board requested judicial enforcement. See Catholic High School
Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1167 (2d Cir. 1985).
125. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159 (1982).
126. See, e.g., id. § 158 (1982).
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1. Labor Board Assertion of Jurisdiction
Some Church leaders have opposed the threshold assertion of board ju-
risdiction 1 7 as curbing their freedom to supervise religious education. 28
They raise two significant concerns. First, labor boards must avoid judg-
ments regarding the relative religiousness of a school 12 '-an inquiry
which led the NLRB to conclude that Catholic schools are not "religious
institutions." 130 Instead, boards must adhere to neutral monetary yard-
sticks (e.g., revenue) in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction."' Sec-
ond, boards must sacrifice their usual discretion to designate an appropri-
ate bargaining unit.132 The NLRB often certified a multi-elementary
school unit to maximize teacher bargaining clout, ignoring the fact that
the Church entrusts control over each elementary school to the local pas-
tor23 3 -in contrast to diocesan high schools under centralized episcopal
administration.lu Labor boards must accept clerical decisions regarding
the autonomy or interdependence of Catholic schools in each diocese and
select bargaining units accordingly. 13 5 With these restrictions, the mere
assertion of jurisdiction over-parochial school labor relations poses little
threat to free exercise.
127. See, e.g., id. § 159 (1982) (describing process of certifying union).
128. See, e.g., Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123, 1126 (7th Cir. 1977), afj'd, 440
U.S. 490 (1979); Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3166, 3170, 3176 (E.D. Pt. 1977). The
Church also argues that board jurisdiction will "chill" its exercise of religious rights. 559 F.2d at
1124; 95 L.R.R.M. at 3177-78; Bastress, supra note 6, at 328-29; Comment, Free Exercise, supra
note 6, at 660-62. Because all regulation affects religious conduct somewhat, the potential for
"chilling" alone is an insufficient reason to strike a statute. See Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert,
753 F.2d 1161, 1170-71 (2d Cir. 1985) (dismissing any "chilling effect" as incidental).
129. See supra notes 11-12, 21. This Note urges abandonment of the NLRB's "completely
religious/religiously associated" test. But see Warner, supra note 6, at 501 (defending Board standard
as avoiding entanglement); Kryvoruka, supra note 6, at 41-42, 46-49 (same).
130. Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976). See also Catholic Bishop,
440 U.S. at 502 (NLRB questioning clergy about school's religious activities infringes free exercise).
131. See supra note 10. Labor boards might shift their focus from the religious employer, consid-
ering instead whether an employee of a religious organization was hired from the public marketplace
and whether he has a secular counterpart. Comment, A New Approach to NLRB Jurisdiction over
the Employment Practices of Religious Institutions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 243 (1987). Applied to paro-
chial schools, this analysis would exclude from jurisdiction religion teachers but not math faculty. Id.
at 273. This "employee activity" test, however, would embroil labor boards in classroom investiga-
tions-for example, whether a biology teacher addressing sexuality from a Catholic perspective has a
secular counterpart. Furthermore, since the Church retains discretion to discipline a teacher who
refuses to implement a religion program as ordered by Catholic authorities, distinctions among lay
teachers are unnecessary, and also would fragment the union.
132. See, e.g., NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
133. Such NLRB insensitivity led to the injunction in Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164
(E.D. Pa. 1977), discussed supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. See Comment, Free Exercise,
supra note 6, at 643-46 (describing Board aims in designating multi-school units and clergy's opposi-
tion). Collective bargaining in elementary schools remains rare.
134. Even so, some bishops object to a multi-high school bargaining unit. See Cardinal Timothy
Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).
135. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (church tribunal, not
secular court, must determine diocesan structure).
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2. Processing Unfair Labor Practice Charges
The possibility of unconstitutional infringement increases when unfair
labor practice charges are filed: in ensuing adversarial procedures, a labor
board's judgments may tread on religious freedoms . 36  Nevertheless,
boards can minimize interference by adapting their ordinary principles of
restraint and by formalizing extant Catholic school bargaining customs.
The Church contends that its refusal to discuss employment terms af-
fecting religious policy will incur board sanctions for violation of the duty
to bargain in good faith, 87 based on the assumption that such matters are
mandatory items of negotiation.' 3 8 However, doctrinal subjects are within
the permissive "management rights" area. The alleged impossibility of
separating secular from religious bargaining issues'39 is belied by dozens
of diocesan collective agreements that accomplish precisely this goal.' 40
Labor boards can avoid conflict by maintaining this dichotomy and by
following their usual practice of not interfering with negotiations over spe-
cific contract terms.14'
Churches also fear that boards will assess the doctrinal validity of as-
serted religious defenses in "mixed motive" discharge cases. 42 For exam-
ple, the Catholic Bishop court posed the hypothetical of a school dis-
missing a pro-union teacher who also advocated a position "totally at odds
with . . .[the] Catholic faith,"14 such as favoring abortion. A discrimina-
tory discharge complaint in this situation could be resolved using estab-
- lished guidelines. In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,"' the
136. Warner, supra note 6, at 474-75.
137. See, e.g., NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). All state labor acts contain similar "good faith"
bargaining provisions. See supra note 48.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89 (refuting this assumption).
139. Many courts have accepted the Church's claim that because parochial schools are "perva-
sively religious," all items of mandatory collective bargaining encompass religious issues. See, e.g.,
Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (NLRB would have "insuperable
task" of separating secular from religious subjects in ascertaining violation of duty to bargain); Catho-
lic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1121-24 (7th Cir. 1977), affid, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
140. See supra notes 85-88. Blurred areas of the "secular vs. religious" bargaining dichotomy
might appear. For example, the "secular" issue of salaries could implicate financial stability, infring-
ing the Church's basic free exercise right to operate schools. But see supra note 94 (statistics reveal no
correlation between collective bargaining and budget difficulties). Even assuming the bishops could
demonstrate that enforced bargaining had such an effect, this would simply indicate the hierarchy's
failure to raise adequate funds. Constitutionally, it is less problematic for the government to insist that
churches recover the expenses of running schools (including costs of compliance with regulations) from
religious adherents than to exempt religious employers from laws. See infra note 151 and accompany-
ing text (discussing this indirect "establishment"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated Church
predictions of financial doom as legally irrelevant in the "parochaid" cases. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (religion clauses mandate denial of state aid to parochial schools
despite their economic plight).
141. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970) (Board cannot compel parties to
agree on collective bargaining contractual details).
142. Boards must sometimes determine whether an employer's proffered reason for firing an em-
ployee is a pretext to punish union activity. See supra note 41.
143. 559 F.2d at 1124-25.
144. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
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Supreme Court held that the NLRB must limit its inquiry to instances
where "but for" anti-union animus, the employer would not have fired a
worker. Applying this standard to parochial schools, Church proof of a
doctrinal reason for discharge (e.g., pro-abortion teaching) would make
any contributing anti-union motivation irrelevant and would foreclose in-
quiry into religious beliefs (e.g., Catholic pro-life theology).1 45
In sum, labor boards may regulate parochial schools by observing these
constitutionally mandated limits: employing neutral jurisdictional stan-
dards, enforcing the duty to bargain over secular issues only, and prose-
cuting unmistakable unfair labor practices. Such modified application of
labor acts reduces the Church's religious claim to an alleged right to avoid
the inconvenience and expense of compliance-incidental hardships not
triggering "compelling state interest" scrutiny.1 46 The government's inter-
est in uniform enforcement of labor laws1 47 outweighs minor, primarily
economic burdens on religious organizations.
1 48
C. Restricted Labor Board Jurisdiction: The Optimal Accommodation
Certainly, the proffered restrictions on labor board conduct somewhat
reduce the effectiveness of labor acts, amounting to a partial exemption for
parochial school employers. Nevertheless, such sensitivity is necessary to
protect free exercise religious liberty.149 This Note's proposal represents
the optimal accommodation: it preserves employees' statutory rights, while
preventing government intrusion into religious affairs. In contrast, the
Catholic Bishop construction of the NLRA crafted a blanket exception 50
145. A more difficult case.involved a teacher who questioned church authority and disparaged the
sacramentality of marriage, but who was not terminated until he became involved in union activities.
The NLRB ruled that because the Catholic school had previously rehired this teacher despite inci-
dents of disrespect, anti-union animus must have motivated the decision. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn, 222 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1056-57 (1976), enforced in part sub nom. Nazareth Regional High
School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1977) (ruling teacher's claim time barred). Under
this Note's framework, the Church's religious reasons for dismissal would have been sufficient to
preclude any inquiry into accompanying anti-union motives.
146. To activate such strict scrutiny, enforcement of a law must exert "substantial pressure" to
modify behavior and to violate beliefs. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
147. This interest is especially strong in states where labor rights are constitutionally guaranteed.
See, e.g.. N.Y. CONSr. art. I. § 17; N.J. CONsr. art. 1, § 19.
148. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law despite finan-
cial impact on Jewish merchants). See also supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text (discussing
constitutional validity of costly regulations). Even pro-Church commentators concede that free exercise
centrally concerns the clergy's control over school management issues involving religion, not wages and
benefits. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1402.
149. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (accommodation
strives to exempt from regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would be infringed
or "to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish"). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (approving property tax exemption
for churches and other nonprofit institutions).
150. Also less than optimal is complete denial of protection for church employers. See, e.g., 1968
N.Y. Laws ch. 890, at 2389 (amending State Labor Relations Act, N.Y. LAB. LAWS § 715 (McKin-
ney 1968) (extending coverage to religious employers without prescribing special labor board proce-
dures). See infra note 155.
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that destroyed these legislative guarantees without serving any additional
purpose except to save Church employers the cost of obeying labor laws.
This indirect aid, not "excessive entanglement," is the key establishment
clause issue raised by parochial school labor relations cases.1"' Because all
attempts to accommodate free exercise in a sense "advance" religion,15 2 a
partial rather than total exemption is always preferable"8 3 when religious
rights can be safeguarded through the less drastic alternative.15 4
Labor board exercise of jurisdiction with due respect for the religious
prerogatives of Catholic school employers 55 obviates the need for judicial
intervention. Unlike legislatures, which may exceed the requirements of
free exercise in accommodating religion, courts lack the power to carve
exceptions into statutes promoting the general welfare 56 unless the free
151. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 518 n.11 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (audi-
dally created exception solely for church schools raises establishment clause question). See also
Warner, supra note 6, at 482-84 (non-assertion of jurisdiction is a "special privilege" forbidden by
establishment clause).
152. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. C'r. REV. 1, 6.
153. This Note rejects the argument that even a successful board attempt to "reasonably accom-
modate" church schools constitutes favoritism violating the establishment clause, whereas wholesale
exemption does not. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1128-31 (7th Cir. 1977), off d, 440
U.S. 490 (1979). See Casenote, 9 S.'roN HA.L L. REV. 333, 355-57 (1978) (exclusion of parochial
schools poses greater establishment problem than accommodation).
154. A legislative full exemption, however, might survive establishment clause scrutiny. In Pre-
siding Bishop v. Amos, the Supreme Court held that Congress' exemption of religious organizations
engaged in secular, nonprofit activities from Title VII's prohibition against religion-based employment
discrimination did not violate the establishment clause. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987) (examining Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 7, § 702, 785 Stat. 241, 266, as amended 1972 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-I (1982))). Justice White assumed the constitutional adequacy of Title
VII's original exemption covering employees fulfilling a religious function (the type of accommodation
this Note favors). Id. at 2868. Nonetheless, the Court noted that a tribunal's failure to perceive the
religious significance of seemingly "secular" activities might interfere with a church's ability to carry
out its religious mission. Therefore, the Court concluded, this amendment constituted "benevolent
neutrality" permitted by the establishment clause and was a legislative decision "entitled to defer-
ence." Id. at 2867-70.
This admittedly broad exemption may nevertheless be deemed "partial" in the sense that Title
VII's other anti-discrimination provisions apply to religious employers. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), discussed supra note 109; EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626
F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), described supra note 120. Thus, Amos
merely allows parochial schools to discriminate against personnel for religious reasons-a privilege
this Note supports. Cf. supra note 145 (Catholic school may fire teacher who flouts Catholic beliefs).
155. Some states have determined that exclusion of church institutions from labor acts is unneces-
sary. See infra note 156. Presumably, though, legislatures intend that labor boards apply statutory
provisions sensitive to the religious concerns of sectarian employers. Whether implicit or explicit, such
lawmaking efforts to facilitate free exercise do not violate the establishment clause. See id.
156. For example, Amos involved Congressional efforts to protect free exercise: A court must
uphold such a legislative accommodation-even one that exceeds that required by free exer-
ise-unless it violates the establishment clause by aiding or sponsoring religion. 107 S. Ct. at
2867-70. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (courts
must "define the proper Establishment Clause limits" on legislative accommodations to prevent gov-
ernment "endorsement" of religion). In contrast, New York's legislature denied a special exemption
for religious employers in its labor relations act. See supra notes 150 & 155. Thus, the statute cannot
raise an establishment clause problem. Instead, the sole judicial inquiry is whether application of the
act violates the free exercise rights of a church employer in a particular case. See generally McCon-
nell, supra note 152, at 30-31 (legislative accommodation requires only prima fade free exercise
claim, whereas judicial exemptions must be "confined to the most serious burdens"). See also Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (because Sherbert v. Verner,
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exercise clause compels this extreme step to remedy a significant infringe-
ment of religious rights.157 Therefore, the Supreme Court has no author-
ity to invalidate a state labor relations act absent evidence of a specific
constitutional violation.1 58
IV. CONCLUSION
Labor board regulation of parochial schools poses unique legal
problems, yet illustrates the more general struggle to reconcile statutory
requirements with the First Amendment. Courts best protect free exercise
values by recognizing only documented claims of burdens on religious be-
liefs and practices and by accommodating religious activity only to the
extent necessary to secure constitutional rights. Blind acceptance of all as-
serted "religious" objections to enforcement of important government poli-
cies frustrates rather than serves the objectives of the religion clauses.
374 U.S. 398 (1963), requires Court to carve statutory exceptions that Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971), forbids legislatures to make, expansive interpretation of both clauses should be abandoned
to allow legislatures greater flexibility).
157. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)).
158. An unfounded assumption (not shared by the legislature) that free exercise problems might
occur is an insufficient basis to strike down a statute. The absence of any facts supporting the clergy's
claims of unconstitutional interference was crucial to the decisions in Catholic High School Ass'n v.
Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir, 1985), and Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 908 (1977).
1987]
